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Matrix games constitute a fundamental problem of game theory and describe a situation of two
players with completely conflicting interests. We show how methods from statistical mechanics can
be used to investigate the statistical properties of optimal mixed strategies of large matrix games
with random payoff matrices and derive analytical expressions for the value of the game and the
distribution of strategy strengths. In particular the fraction of pure strategies not contributing to
the optimal mixed strategy of a player is calculated. Both independently distributed as well as
correlated elements of the payoff matrix are considered and the results compared with numerical
simulations.
PACS: 05.20-y, 02.50.Le, 64.60.C
Game theory models in mathematical terms prob-
lems of strategic decision-making typically arising in eco-
nomics, sociology, or international relations and owes
much of its modern form to J. von Neumann [1]. The
generic situation in game theory consists of a set of
players {X,Y, . . .} choosing between different strate-
gies {Xi}, {Yi}, . . ., the combination of which deter-
mines the outcome of a game specified by the payoffs
PX(Xi, Yi, . . .), PY (Xi, Yi, . . .), . . . each player is going to
receive. The payoffs depend on the strategies of all play-
ers and the problem for every individual player is to
choose his strategy such as to optimize his payoff with-
out having control over the strategies of all other play-
ers. Despite the extreme simplification of the real world
situation inherent in this framework, game theory has
proven not only to be a viable mathematical discipline
but also to be able to characterize important features of
economical systems. Many interesting results have been
obtained since von Neumann’s pioneering work including
the characterization of equilibria [1,2] and the emergence
of cooperation [3]. However, detailed investigations have
been restricted either to general statements concerning
e.g., the existence of equilibria, or to situations where
every player has only a small number of strategies at
his disposal and where the payoffs are simple functions
of these strategies. As many situations of interest show
a large number of possible strategies and rather com-
plicated relationships between strategic choices and the
resulting payoffs, it is tempting to model the payoffs by
a random function and to apply the methods of statis-
tical mechanics to describe the properties of the game.
This will be a sensible approach if there are characteris-
tic “macroscopic” quantities which do not depend on the
particular realization of the random parameters, i.e. are
self-averaging in the sense of the statistical mechanics of
disordered systems [4], for related applications see [5].
In the present letter we show how methods from sta-
tistical mechanics can be applied to characterize the sta-
tistical properties of optimal strategies in matrix games
with large randomly chosen payoff matrices. Explicitly
we calculate the mean payoff and the fraction of pure
strategies which occur in the optimal mixed strategy of
a player. For simplicity we restrict ourselves to matrix
games, the type of zero-sum games between two play-
ers which also forms the basis of von Neumann’s treat-
ment [1,6]. Such games are defined by a (not necessar-
ily square) payoff-matrix cij : Player X may choose be-
tween N strategies Xi and player Y between M strate-
gies Yj where i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . ,M . At each
step of this game they receive the payoffs PX(Xi, Yj) =
−PY (Xi, Yj) =: cij . As player X wishes to gain as large
a payoff cij as possible, whereas player Y must attempt
to reach as small a value of cij in order to maximize
his payoff PY (Xi, Yj) = −cij , the goals of the players
are completely conflicting. Thus it is appropriate for the
players to proceed as follows: Player X knows that when
playing strategy Xi he will receive at least the payoff
minj cij . He therefore chooses strategy Xi∗ satisfying
minj ci∗j = maximinj cij . Equivalently, player Y plays
strategy Yj∗ determined by maxi cij∗ = minj maxi cij
since it minimizes his losses for the optimal choices of
X . It is easy to show that maximinj cij ≤ minj maxi cij
always. The situation is simple if the matrix has a so-
called saddle-point, i.e. if there is a pair i∗, j∗ satisfying
maximinj cij = ci∗j∗ = minj maxi cij . In this case it is
optimal for both players to stick to their pure strategies
Xi∗ and Yi∗ respectively, since deviations from an optimal
strategy by one of the players will lead to a lower payoff
for this player. For a large random matrix c the proba-
bility for the existence of a such a saddle point vanishes
exponentially with the size of the matrix and the choice
of an optimal strategy is less obvious. Since in this case
maximinj cij < minj maxi cij , player X will attempt to
achieve a greater gain than his guaranteed minimal gain
maximinj cij and likewise Y will attempt to achieve a
smaller loss than minj maxi cij . To this end they have
to prevent their opponent from guessing which strategy
they are going to play and choose each strategy with a
certain probability xi and yj respectively [1]. A vector
xi of probabilities is called a mixed strategy and by the
normalization condition is constrained to lie on the N -
dimensional simplex. The famous minimax theorem by
1
von Neumann states that for any payoff matrix c there
exists a saddle point of mixed strategies, i.e. there are
two vectors x∗i and y
∗
j such that
max
{xi}
min
{yj}
∑
ij
xi cij yj =
∑
ij
x∗i cij y
∗
j = min{yj}
max
{xi}
∑
ij
xi cij yj .
The expected payoff for the optimal mixed strategies
νc :=
∑
ij x
∗
i cij y
∗
j is called the value of the game and
x∗i ,y
∗
i denote optimal mixed strategies of player X and Y
since again deviations from an optimal strategy by one
of the players will lead to a lower payoff for this player.
In the following we show how the statistical proper-
ties of such optimal mixed strategies for random payoff
matrices may be characterized analytically in the limit
N → ∞,M → ∞ with M/N = α = O(1). As is gener-
ally the case in fully connected disordered systems, only
the first two cumulants of the probability distribution
P ({cij}) are relevant. Since an average value 〈〈c〉〉 of the
elements of the payoff matrix only results in a modified
value of the game νc + 〈〈c〉〉 without changing the opti-
mal mixed strategies, we may set 〈〈c〉〉 = 0 without loss
of generality and take the elements cij to be indepen-
dent Gaussian distributed variables with zero mean and
variance N−1.
We then note [6] that a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the mixed strategy {xi} of playerX to be optimal
is
∑
i
xicij ≥ νc ∀j . (1)
The condition is necessary since if violated for some j
player Y playing Yj will lead to a payoff lower than νc.
It is also sufficient since combining (1) with the minimax
theorem gives
∑
ij xi cij y
∗
j = νc. We may thus charac-
terize mixed strategies of player X by introducing the
partition function
Z(ν) =
∏N
i=1(
∫∞
0 dxi)δ(
∑N
i=1 xi −N)
∏αN
j=1 Θ(
∑
i xicij − ν)∏N
i=1(
∫∞
0 dxi)δ(
∑N
i=1 xi −N)
,
(2)
where Θ(x) is the Heaviside step-function and the prob-
abilities of playing a given strategy and the payoff have
been rescaled so that
∑N
i=1 xi = N for convenience.
Thus Z(ν) equals the fraction of the simplex obeying∑
i xicij ≥ ν ∀j and therefore lies on the interval [0, 1].
Since Z(ν) scales exponentially with N, the quantity cen-
tral to our calculation is the entropy S(ν) := 1/N lnZ(ν),
which in general will be negative as usual for classical
systems with continuous degrees of freedom.
Assuming the entropy S(ν) to be self-averaging, we
use the replica-trick lnZ = limn→0 ddnZ
n and compute
the average over the payoffs of the replicated partition
function for integer n (a, b = 1 . . . n). The calculation
proceeds by using the integral representation of the Heav-
iside step-function and by introducing the symmetric ma-
trix of overlap order parameters qab = 1/N
∑
i x
a
i x
b
i via
integrals over qab and delta-functions represented by in-
tegrals over the conjugate order parameters qˆab [7]. The
integrals over Ea arise from the integral representation
of the constraint
∑
i x
a
i = N giving
〈〈Zn(ν)〉〉 =
∏
a≥b
∫
dqabdqˆab
2pi/N
∏
a
∫
dEa
2pi/N
(3)
exp(−iN
∑
a≥b
qabqˆab − iN
∑
a
Ea)
∏
a,i
∫ ∞
0
dxai exp(i
∑
a≥b,i
qˆabx
a
i x
b
i + i
∑
a,i
Eax
a
i )
∏
a,j
∫ ∞
ν
dλaj
∫
dyaj
2pi
exp(−1
2
∑
a,b,j
qaby
a
j y
b
j + i
∑
a,j
yaj λ
a
j )
In the limit of large payoff matrices N → ∞ the inte-
grals over order parameters are dominated by their sad-
dle point. Throughout this paper we use the replica-
symmetric ansatz [8]
qaa = q1 iqˆaa = −1/2 qˆ1 iEa = E ∀a (4)
qab = q0 iqˆab = qˆ0 ∀a > b .
The limit n → 0 of (3) may now be taken by analytic
continuation giving an entropy
S(ν) = extrq1,q0,E,qˆ1,qˆ0 [
1
2
q1qˆ1 +
1
2
q0qˆ0 − E + 1
2
ln(2pi)
+α
∫
Ds lnH(
√
q0s+ ν√
q1 − q0 )−
1
2
ln(qˆ1 + qˆ0)− 1
+
qˆ0 + E
2
2(qˆ1 + qˆ0)
+
∫
Dr lnH(−
√
qˆ0r + E√
qˆ1 + qˆ0
)], (5)
where Ds = ds√
2pi
exp(−s2/2), and H(x) = ∫∞x Ds. Nu-
merical evaluation of (5) shows that S(ν) is a contin-
uously decreasing function of ν. At νc it tends to −∞,
indicating that for larger values of ν there are no more so-
lutions to (1). Furthermore as ν → νc one finds q0 → q1
indicating that as the points contributing to (2) crowd
into an ever decreasing area of the simplex which shrinks
to a point at νc their mutual overlap q0 approaches the
self-overlap q1.
In this regime the entropy may be conveniently written
in terms of the order parameters q0, qˆ0, E, wˆ = qˆ1+qˆ0 and
v = q1−q0. For ν < νc S(ν) describes sub-optimal strate-
gies. As v → 0 we find qˆ0 ∼ v−2, wˆ ∼ v−1. Rescaling the
conjugate order parameters accordingly and expanding
the saddle-point equations to leading order in v as v → 0
we find
wˆ − αH(−νc/√q0) = 0 (6)
wˆ −H(−E/
√
qˆ0) = 0
qˆ0 − (ν2c + q0)wˆ − α
√
q0νcG(−νc/√q0) = 0
q0 − (E2 + qˆ0)/wˆ −√q0E/wˆ2G(−E/
√
qˆ0) = 0
2
with E = q0wˆ − qˆ0.
The statistical properties of optimal strategies {xopti }
may be deduced from the proportion of strategiesXi with
xi > a
θ(a) := 〈〈1/N
∑
i
Θ(xopti − a)〉〉 = H(
wˆa− E√
qˆ0
) . (7)
Thus only a fraction θ(0) = wˆ of the pure strategies Xi
have xi > 0 and are played with non-zero probability.
This striking effect may be explained by considering the
behaviour of player Y , whose optimal mixed strategy y∗j
obeys λ∗i =
∑
j cijy
∗
j ≤ νc ∀i. Since νc = 1/N
∑
i x
∗
i λ
∗
i ,
x∗i must be zero if λ
∗
i < νc. This mechanism thus ensures
an expected payoff νc to X , even if Y chooses an optimal
strategy. However it is not to be confused with the con-
cept of domination, widely discussed in the game theory
literature [1,6,9], where a strategy Xi has xi = 0 because
whatever the response of the opponent some other pure
or mixed strategy will lead to a higher expected pay-
off. In fact in the thermodynamic limit domination of
a pure strategy occurs with probability zero since for a
pure strategy Xk to be dominated by a mixed strategy
xDi requires 1/N
∑
i x
D
i cij ≥ ckj∀j but the lhs is O(N−1)
whereas the rhs is O(N−1/2).
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FIG. 1. The value of the game νc and (inset) the fraction of
strategies played with non-zero probability θ(0) as a function
of α. The analytical results (full line) are compared to nu-
merical simulations with N=200 averaged over 200 samples.
The symbol size corresponds to the statistical error.
Figure 1 shows the value of the game and (inset) the
fraction of strategies played with non-zero probability as
a function of the aspect ratio α of the payoff matrix. At
α = 1 νc = 0 and θ(0) = 1/2. The result νc = 0 at α = 1
is a consequence of the symmetry of the distribution of
payoffs under cij → −cji, i.e. under interchange of player
X and player Y [10]. For α > 1 player Y has a greater
choice of strategies than player X and vice versa. As
expected, the payoff to player X decreases as the range
of strategy choices of player Y increases. The fraction of
strategies played with non-zero probability increases with
α, which reflects the decrease of νc with α: At lower νc
there are fewer i with λ∗i =
∑
j cijy
∗
j < νc, so as argued
above the number of strategies Xi played with non-zero
probability increases as a result.
We next abandon the initial assumption that the indi-
vidual entries cij in the payoff-matrix are independently
distributed and consider the case where the outcomes of
the game for different strategy choices of the players are
correlated with each other. Such correlations may arise
quite naturally in real applications since we expect some
strategies to have broadly similar properties and hence
yield similar results for a given response of the respective
opponent. For simplicity we restrict the discussion to the
case α = 1. The most general tractable case appears to
be
〈〈cijckl〉〉/(〈〈cij〉〉〈〈ckl〉〉) =: C(ij)(kl) = CcikCrjl (8)
where Ccik and Crjl refer to column- and row-like correla-
tions. Of course P ({cij}) is not uniquely determined by
its second moments, but as argued above it suffices to
consider Gaussian distributed payoff matrices so
P ({cij}) = 1√
(2pi)N2‖C‖
exp(−N/2
∑
ijkl
cijC−1 (ij)(kl)ckl)
(9)
The specific form of Ccik and Crjl we will consider in the
following is
Cc,rik =
{
1 i = k
cc,r/N i 6= k (10)
and the resulting replica symmetric entropy averaged
over the distribution (9) may be calculated as outlined
for the case of uncorrelated payoffs above. Again in the
limit v → 0 the corresponding saddle point equations de-
scribe optimal strategies. For cc = cr = c the optimal
payoff is zero as a result of the symmetry of (9) under
the exchange of players. Figure 2 shows the fraction θ(0)
of strategies played with non-zero probability in optimal
strategies as a function of c. θ(0) decreases with increas-
ing c: At positive c there are strategies which tend to be
beneficial for player X whatever the response of the op-
ponent. As a result X concentrates on a smaller fraction
of his strategies and vice versa for negative c.
In the asymmetric case cr = c, cc = 0 however a non-
zero value of the game is possible. The resulting value
for νc and the fraction of strategies played with non-zero
probability are shown in figure 3. Again the correlation
between payoffs in the same row of the payoff matrix
lead to strategies which tend to be either beneficial or
detrimental to player X .
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FIG. 2. The fraction θ(0) strategies played with non-zero
probability as a function of c = cr = cc.
By admitting only the beneficial ones into his mixed
strategies, X may achieve a positive payoff. The fraction
of strategies played with non-zero probability decreases
accordingly. For negative c the entries in the same rows
of the payoff matrix are anticorrelated, so different re-
sponses of player Y to the same strategy of player X
tend to lead to different payoffs. This situation leads to
a negative value of the game.
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FIG. 3. The optimal payoff νc (full) and the fraction θ(0) of
strategies played with non-zero probability (dotted) against
c = cr at cc = 0.
The simulation results shown in figures 1-3 were ob-
tained using the simplex-algorithm to solve the linear
programming problem [6] defined by (1) for a system of
size N = 200 averaged over 200 payoff matrices with
Gaussian distributed inputs [11].The numerical results
show very good agreement with the analytical expres-
sions.
In conclusion we have shown that techniques from
the statistical mechanics of disordered systems may be
used to analyze the statistical properties of optimal so-
lutions of matrix games with random payoffs. Self-
averaging “macroscopic” quantities such as the value of
the game were identified and calculated for various proba-
bility distributions. These quantities include the fraction
of strategies played with non-zero probability. Further
problems in matrix games which may be treated using
these methods include the effects of deviating from the
optimal strategy and the influence of perturbations of
the payoff matrix on the optimal strategy, which forms
the basis of the justification for the full stability of mixed
equilibria [12]. Furthermore work is in progress on a field
of interest to current mathematical game theory, the sta-
tistical description of Nash-equilibria in bimatrix games.
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